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What are the economics of patents?  What problems arise in
implementing a patent system? How much  do distortions in de-
veloping countries affect the benefits and costs of  a patent
system?  And what are the policies that would increase the
likelihood of patents benefiting a developing country?
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part of a larger effort in PPR to increase the understanding of the impact of patent protection on developing
economies. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.
Please contact Maria Teresa Sanchez, room S8-039, extension 33833 (30 pages with figures and tables).
The idea behind patent policies is to increase the  Second and more fundamentally, the invest-
output of commercially useful innovations by  ments that patent incentives trigger in research
creating a transitory property right that allows  and development are one of many uses for
the inventor to appropriate part of the retums  scarce savings.  Retums to investments protected
from his invention.  by patents depend on the productivity - the
inventive process and the industrial applicability
In practice, the issue is so complex that after  of innovations. For several reasons - including
evaluating the U.S. patent system in 1958 Fritz  the paucity of experience in research and devel-
Machlup concluded, "If we did not have a patent  opment - the productivity of inventive and
system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of  iinovative processes might be low in some
our present knowledge of its economic conse-  developing countries.  In such situations care
quences, to recommend instituting one.  But  should be taken that scarce investment resources
since we have had a patent system for a long  are not wasted in unproductive research and
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of  development endeavors.
our present knowledge, to recommend abolish-
ing it."  Empirical research done in the 30 years  The paper also argues that in unstable and
since Machlup's study suggests that the patent  protected economies, the social returns of
system has benefited competitive industrial  patented innovations might be low.  One reason
countries in important ways.  for this is that innovations that are appropriate
for a given productive structure might not be
In developing countries, two types of  applicable when a shift in policies induces a new
considerations need to be addressed. First, there  economic structure. If so, the analysis suggests
are issues of designing an appropriate patent  a seq-encing of policies where patent protection
system. This includes considerations of admin-  should be strengthened once developing coun-
istrative efficiency, the impact on government  tries have achieved a level of savings compatible
expenditures, and the legal administration of  with investments in risky research and develop-
intellectual property rights.  ment projects, relative economic stability and
competition through open market policies.
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get thcse findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
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References  29NOTES  ON PATENTS,  DISTORTIONS  AND  DEVELOPMENT*
Julio  Noguis
I.  Introduction
What  are  the  simple  economics  of patents?  What  are  some  of the
problems  of implementing  a patent  system?  To  what  extent  do  the  distortions
of  developin,g  countries  affect  the  social  benefits  and  costs  of  a patent
system?  Finally,  what  policy  suggestions  can  be  made  for  increasing  the
likelihood  that  patents  will  enhance  welfare  in  developing  countries?  These
are  the  questions  addressed  in  this  paper.
The  topic  of patents  is  a complex  one  involving  several  fields
including  economic,  technological,  sociological  and  legal  issues.  The  purpose
of  the  paper  is  essentially  to  offer  a survey  of the  questions  posed  and  not
to  provide  a definite  answer  to them. I should  also  mention  that  the  focus  of
the  paper  is  on process  and  not  product  innovations.
The  paper  is  arranged  in  the  following  way. Sections  II  and  III
provide  a discussion  of the  patent  system  much  of it  based  on the  existing
literature.  Section  II  summarizes  a simple  model  that  is  useful  to  analyze
the  economic  impact  of  patents  including  the  optimal  level  of private
investment  in  research  and  development  (RD),  the  optimal  length  of  a patent,
and  the  efficiency  of patents.  Section  III  provides  a  discussion  of the
social  costs  and  benefits  of  patents  in  competitive  economies.
This  background  leads  to  a  discussion  in  Section  IV  on  how  the
character:istics  of  developing  countries  might  affect  patent  policies.  I argue
*t  I appreciate  extensive  comments  received  fror  Bela  Balassa  and  Paul  Meo.-2-
that  in these  countries,  distortions  and  instabilities  could  imply  low  social
rates  of  return  to  patents.  This  Section  also  includes  a  discussion  of the
sequencing  of patent  policies  in  economies  that  are  highly  distorted  and
unstable.
II. A Simple  Model  of  Investment  in  Research  and  Optimal  Patent  Life
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  summarize  a simple  model  on the
economics  of patents.  This  model  was  developed  twenty  years  ago,  but  it  is
still  often  used  as  the  basis  for  further  theoretical  developments.  The
discussion  will  be  made  graphically  and  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  original
mathematical  developmnt  by  Nordhaus  (1969).
Figure  i  portrays  the  case  of  a process  innovation  in  a firm  located
in  a  competitive  industry. It  will  be  assumed  that  the  industry  faces  a
Figure  1
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linear  demand  curve  and  has  constant  costs. The  process  innovation  results  in
a  downward  shift  of the  cost  function  from  C0 to  C1. A patent  will  allow  the
innovating  firm  to  choose  between  two  strategies.  On the  one  hand,  the  firm
can  license  its  innovation  or  sell  it  to  other  firms. Given  the  competitive
nature  of the  industry,  the  maximum  royalty  pet.  unit  of output  that  the
innovating  firm  can  charge  to its  competitors  is  CoC 1.
The firm  can  also  choose  to  displace  its  competitors  and  supply  the
market  demand  making  a  profit  equivalent  to the  area  CONCI.  It  will  be
noted.  that  the  innovating  firm  will  alter  its  pre-invention  profit-maximizing
price-output  decision  only  in  the  case  of inventions  which  imply  major  cost
reductions.
The  social  benefit  of  the  patent  is  represented  by the  area  of  the
rectangle  COENC 1 during  the  life  of the  patent  an3  this  area  plus  the  consumer
surplus  triangle  EAN  (or  COEACI),  from  the  moment  the  patent  expires  to
infinity  or until  a new  innovation  becomes  more  cost  effective.  On the  other
hand,  the  social  cost  is  given  by the  consumer  surplus  loss  during  the  life  of
the  patent,  or  the  area  EAN  plus  the  resources  used  in  RD triggered  by the
patent  system. Given  these  considerations,  what  is  the  optimal  level  of  RD?
What  is  the  optimal  life  of  a patent? What  is  the  efficiency  of the  patent
system?
1.  Optimal  level  of RD I/
The  answer  to  the  first  question  is  facilitated  by  the  introduction
of Figure  2. Here,  the  vertical  axis  shows  percentage  cost  reductions.  The
1/  The  graphs  that  follows  are  taken  from  Scherer  (1972).- 4  -









y  X  RD. 
It is assumed  that the productivity  of RD can be approximated  by
B(RD)  function  which eventually  has decreasing  returns.  Whether there is a
segment  of increasing  returns in  the B(RD)  function  is  not clear from the
empirical literature. As a matter  of fact,  Nordhaus  developed  his model based
on empir cal researchp  which showed  continous  decreasing  returns to RD
(Nordhaus,  1969,  p. 80).  It  is  also noted that  RD is an Activity  whose output
is very uncertain  but as I  will note  below,  recent  developments  have
incorporated  this feature  into the  model.
On the other  hand, under the  assumption  of linear  demand and cost
functions,  the rent schedule  Q(B,T) is  also linear  and is  a function  of the
cost reduction  and the length (T)  of  the patent.  As the patent life
increases,  the  Q function  rotates  to  the right  but because  additional benefits- 5 -
from  longer  patents  are  discounted  more  heavily,  the  extent  of rightward  shift
of the  Q function  diminishes  as  T increases.  It  is  noted  that  what  determines
the  position  of the  Q(B,T)  function  is ;ot  the  legal  duration  of patents,  but
the  effective  market  protection  that  they  provide.  Thus,  it  is  possible  for
the  legal  length  of patents  to  be changed  while  at the  same  time  not  affecting
the  industry  or even  the  economy-wide  level  of  RD.
The  location  of the  rent  function  also  depends  on the  private  rate  of
discount.  Given  the  cost  reduction  of  the  innovation  and  the  length  of the
patent,  a  reduction  in the  rate  of  discount  will  rotate  the  Q function
clockwise.
Figure  2 provides  an  answer  to  the  optimal  level  of  RD by  the
innovating  firm  which  is  determined  by  the  profit  maximization  condition. In
Figure  2 this  occurs  at point  Y  where  the  horizontal  difference  between  the
B(RD)  function  and  Q(B,T)  function  is  maximum. In  this  case,  the  innovating
firm  will  invest  OY in  RD for  a total  profit  of  YX.
2.  Optimal life  of a patent
Given  these  considerations,  what  length  of patents  maximizes
society's  welfare? To  answer  this  question  we  need  to  introduce  the  social
costs  of innovations.  The  price  society  pays  for  an innovation  that  reduces
costs  from  C0 to  C 1 is  given  by  the  welfare  triangle  EAN  during  the  life  of
the  patent,  plus  the  inventor's  RD  costs.  1/ As the  patent  life  increases,
society  must  wait  longer  to  gain  the  surplus  EAN. At the  same  time,  the
diminishing  returns  to  RD implies  that  after  some  point,  a longer  patent  life
might  result  in proportionately  less  inventions.  Scherer  (1972)  has  concluded
1/ Other  costs  of patents  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section.-6-
that  '...sooner  or  later,  these  diminishing  return  effects  overpower  .ociety's
interest  in  stimulating  additional  cost  reductions  by  extending  the  patent
life. Therefore,  in  all  but  some  special  limiting  cases  there  exists  a finite
socially  optimal  patent  life
To be  more  explicit,  Nordhaus  (1969)  assumed  that:
B (RD) a  B  RDa
With  this  assumption  and  using  a  social  discount  rate  of  20X,  he  determined
the  optimal  life  of  a patent. The  figures  are  shown  in  Table  1.
Table  1: OPTIMAL  LIFE  OF  A PATENT
(In  num  er of  years)
value  of
Demand  B
Elasticity  0.001  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.10
0.25  34.0  22.5  19.1  14.7  11.6
0.50  30.5  19.1  15.8  11.6  8.6
0.75  28.5  17.1  13.9  9.8  7.2
1.0  27.0  15.8  12.6  8.7  6.2
1.5  25.0  13.9  10.8  7.2  5.0
2.0  23.6  12.6  9.6  6.2  4.2
4.0  20.2  9.6  6.9  4.2  2.9
10.0  15.8  6.2  4.2  2.6  1.8
Source: Abridged  from  Table  5.1.  in  Nordhaus  (1969).
Based  on this  simple  model,  the  following  conclusions  can  be  made:
- Pirst,  for  a given  percentage  cost  reduction,  the  welfare  cost
paid  by society  for  the  innovation  (EAN)  is  higher  the  higher  is
the  price  elasticity  of  demand. Thus,  ceteris  paribus,  a  high
1/  For  a discussion  of the  productivity  of  RD  and  of patents  in  the  U.S.,  see
Criliches  (1989).-7-
price  elasticity  of product  demand  implies  a lower  optimal  patent
life.
- Second,  the  easier  "...it  is  to  achieve  a  given  cost  reduction,
the shorter  the  optimal  patent  life  will be ... ".  This is so
because  for  given  B  and  Q functions,  bigger  cost  reduction
innovations  imply  larger  welfare  losses,  which  society  wants  to
avoid.
- Third,  the  more  pronounced  the  decreasing  returns  to  RD,  the
shorter  the  optimal  patent  life  is. A lengthening  of the  patent
life  that  induces  RD leading  to small  cost  reduction  innovations
must  be  weighted  by the  higher  welfare  loss  incurred  by society.
Thus  in  general,  a shorter  patent  life  is  likely  to be  optimal
when  RD expenditures  are  characterized  by strong  decreasing
returns.
- Fourth,  a reduction  in  the  social  rate  of discount  increases  the
optimal  patent  life. This  also  occurs  when  inventors  are  ris.
averse  and  their  discount  rate  is  higher  than  the  social  discount
rate. In Figure  2,  an increase  in  the  rate  of  discount  can  be
depicted  as a leftward  rotation  in  the  Q function.  The  negative
impact  of  a high  discount  rate  on RD  can  be  compensated  with
longer  patent  protection  which  as said,  is  equivalent  to  a
rightward  rotation  of the  Q function.- a  -
Fifth,  for  big  innovations,  i.e.,  innovationi  whlich  reduce  costs
substantially,  the  optimal  patent  life  should  be longer. Why  this
should  be the  case  can  be seen  in  Figure  3,  where  a  major
innovation  reduces  costs  from  Co to  C1. The  new  cost  schedule
allows  the  innovating  firm  to  monopoly  price  at  OC 2. Given  that
this  price  is  below  OCO,  the  consumer  obtains  immediate  gains  frcm
the  innovation.  Thus,  longer  patents  are  socially  beneficial  whr





In practice,  the  length  of patents  varies  greatly  among  countries  and
between  industries.  In  the  U.S.,  patents  last  for  17  years  from  date  of
approval. Although  it  is  not  clear  how  this  length  was  determined,  it  is
worth  quoting  Machlup  on the  determina'ion  of the  patent  length  in  England:
"The  14-year  term  of the  English  patents  after  1624  was  based  on  the  idea  that- 9  -
2 sets  of  apprentices  should,  in  7  years  each,  be trained  in  the  new
techniques,  though  a  pro.  'ngation  by  another  7  years  was  to  be  allowed  in
exceptional  cases"  (kachlup  119581,  p.  9).  Nordhaus  adds  sarcastically  that
after  "...some  further  compromise  it  was  decided  for  the  United  States  that
2.43  apprentices,  or 17  years,  would  be the  proper  length..."  (Nordhaus,
1969,  p.  82).
Note  also,  that  in  mat:y  countries  the  length  of  patents  is  uniform
across  industries.  Nevertheless,  the  simple  economics  of patents  suggests
that  to  the  extent  uhat  elasticities  of product  demand  and  cost  and
productivity  of research  and  development  varies  across  industries,  optimal
patent  lengths  should  differ  between  industries.
But  probably  because  these  functions  cannot  be  estimated  with  great
precision  at the  industry  and  product  level,  policymakers  have  opted  for
uniform  patent  lengths.  One  theoretical  justification  for  this  is  that  in the
previous  model,  beyond  a  certain  number  of  years--usually  ten  or  less--the
welfare  provided  by  the  patent  system  cannot  be  altered  significantly.
3.  Efficiency  of  patents
Given  that  the  patent  system  implies  a  welfare  loss  from  the  monopoly
position,  what  proportion  of the  maximum  welfare  is  achieved  by it? Assuming
an  elasticity  of  demand  of  2.0  and  a  cost  reduction  innovation  of 10,  the
patent  system  achieves  66%  of the  maximum  welfare  (Nordhaus,  1969,  Table  5.4).
The  issue  of efficiency  of the  patent  system  is  important.
Policymakers  should  make  an effort  to "...determine  when  the  patent  system  has
so  low  a level  of  efficiency  that  other  mechanisms  for  encouraging
technological  change  should  be  substituted  for  it ... "  (Nordhaus,  1969,  p.
86).  For  example,  it  has  been  shown  that  under  certain  conditions  other- 10  -
policies  such  as prizes  and  research  contracts,  are  superior  to  patents
(Wright,  1972). It it  not  at  all  clear  why  these  alternative  policies  have
been  left  out  of the  policy  debate.
III. Social  Benefits  and  Costs  of  the  Patent  System  in  Competitive  Economies
The  previous  section  discussed  the  simple  economics  of the  patent
system. The  purpose  here  is  to introduce  further  issues  and  make  some  general
comments  on the  benefits  and  costs  of patents.  These  coments are  based  on
the  experience  of the  U.S. As  will  tecome  clear  in  the  next  section,  the
relative  importance  of costs  and  benefits  in  developing  countries  might  be
quite  different.
1. The  social  benefits  of  patents
In  a thorough  review  of the  US patent  system  published  more  than
thirty  years  ago,  Machlup  concluded  that  the  profession  is  confronted  with
conflicting  Lheories.  "...On  the  basis  ot the  theory  of  the  'competitive
compulsion  to  keep  ahead'  one  might  think  that  firms  would  invent  and  innovate
even  without  patent  protection.  But  on the  basis  of  the  theory  of  the
'competitive  elimination  of  profits'  one  might  think  that  without  patent
protection  it  would  not  pay  to  invent  and  to  innovate,  and  that  firms  could
not  afford  to invest  in  research  and  development.  On the  strength  of the
theory  of the  'sufficiency  of the  innovator's  headstart'  one  might  think  that
many  innovators  would  have  enough  time  to recover  their  costs  of innovation.
But  on  the  strength  of the  theory  of  the  'nearly  perfect  competition  from
imitators'  one  might  think  that  few  innovators  would  get  away  without
losses..."  Furthermore,  no  "...  conclusive  empirical  evidence  is  available  to
decide  this  conflict  of theories..."  and  therefore  none  "...  of the  empirical- 11  -
evidence  at our  disposal  and  none  of the  theoretical  arguments  presented
either  confirms  or  confutes  the  belief  that  the  patent  system  has  promoted  the
progress  of the  technical  arts  and  the  productivity  of the  economy..."
(Machlup,  1958,  p. 79).
Research  undertaken  since  then  has  thrown  light  on some  of Machlup's
considerations  and  of the  benefits  of the  patent  system. For  example,  in the
simple  model  of Section  II,  patents  which  pass  the  market  test  can  be expected
in  general  to provide  a  net  social  benefit. Empirically,  it  has  been  proved
that  for  some  industries,  patents  are  a powerful  incentive  to innovations
(Leving  et.  al.,  1986).
Also,  because  patents--unlike  trade  secrets-make  public  the  basic
principles  of an invention,  they  facilitate  further  innovations  and  permit
their  faster  diffusion.
But  how  much  do these  benefits  add? An  educated  guess  has  recently
been  provided  by  Criliches.  In  discussing  the  residual  of  an aggregate
production  function  for  the  U.S.,  he states  that  "...  not  all  productivity
growth  is  due  to  invention  and  only  some  fraction  of  the  latter  arises  from
patented  inventions.  If  one  takes  1.5  to  2.0  percent  as  the  approximate
growth  rate  per  year  in total  factor  productivity,  at least  half  of it is
likely  to be  due  to  the  growth  in  the  quality  of the  labor  force,  economies  of
scale,  and  various  reallocations  of  capital  between  assets  and  industries.
Moreover,  it  is  unlikely  that  patented  inventions  would  account  for  more  than
half  of all  the  relevant  advances  in  knowledge.  This  leaves  us  with  at  most  a
quarter  of total  productivity  growth,  and  an  unknown  fraction  of its
fluctuations,  to  be  attributed  to  patented  inventions..."  (Criliches,  1989,
p.  220). For  1982--the  year  that  Criliches  was  looking  at-this amounted  to
approximately  US$12  billion.- 12  -
2.  Social  cost  of the  patents
Griliches  has  provided  a rough  estimate  of the  net  social  gains  of
patents. But  the  approach  does  not  throw  light  on  the  extent  to  which  greater
gains  could  be  achieved. SGme  insights  can  be  gained  by looking  at the  cost
side  of  patents.
In  addition  to  the  RD  expenditures  and  the  monopoly  welfare  loss,
other  social  costs  of the  patent  system  arise  from  losses  from  uniform  patent
protection,  the  value  of  resources  used  in  its  administration  and  the  cost  of
producing  non-used  patented  innovations.  Going  a step  further,  some  observers
have  argued  that  patents  have  been  involved  in  legal  harassment  cases,  and
that  restrictive  licensing  have  at  times  been  abusive.
The  analysis  in  the  previous  section  suggests  that  optimal  patent
duration  varies  between  industries  and  over  time. But  because  these
adjustments  should  be  based  on  information  that  is  usually  not  available,  or
if  available  of dubious  reliance,  policymakers  have  enacted  uniform  patent
protection  across  broad  group  of industries.  This  second  best  policy  entails
a  loss  which  to  my  knowledge  has  not  been  estimated.
The  value  of resources  used  for  administration  is  a social  cost  of
the  patent  system. In  many  countries,  the  patent  offices  appear  to  be
understaffed  and  for  example  in  the  US,  it  has  been  found  that  the  number  of
patent  examiners  is  a significant  variable  for  explaining  the  number  of
patents  processed  and  granted  (Griliches,  1989,  p.  5). Given  the
administrative  costs  of increasing  the  number  of patent  examiners,  it  has  been
suggested  that  payment  of a non-trivial  fee  at the  time  of  patent  application
could  serve  as  an impersonal  preliminary  screening  of potentially  profitable
new  inventions.- 13  -
Also,  sometimes  patents  push  resources  to  be engaged  in  useless
innovations.  Unfortunately,  not  much  evidence  appears  to be  available  in  this
area,  but  one  quotation  from  "The  Economist"  is  of interest  "...Of  all  the
drugs  brought  to  market  during  1988  by  the  25  largest  companies,  84%  were
considered  by the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  to  have  little  or  no
contribution  to  make  to  existing  medical  therapies..."  ("The  Economist",
1989). More  generally,  whiether  an invention  passes  the  patent  test  and
represents  a "significant  technological  advance,"  is  not  determined  by
economic  but  by scientific  and  technological  considerations.  Therefore,  it
comes  as  no surprise  to  observe  that  a  great  majority  of patents  never  become
marketed. For  example,  Machlup  (1958)  cites  work  by  Meinhardt  (1950,  p.  66)
who  argued  that  uneconomic  exploitation  is  the  main  reason  why  80%  to  90%  of
patents  were  not  produced.
Mention  should  also  be  made  of the  fact  that  market  power  can  be
enhanced,  or the  security  of  patent  rights  affected,  by  means  of  legal
harassment.  For  example,  "...Between  1900  and  1941,  684  radio  patents  were
involved  in a total  of 1,567  infringement  suits. Inventors  like  Lee  de Forest
and  Edwin  Armstrong  were  forced  to  sell  out  their  rights  in  key  patents
because,  as  Armstrong  later  lamented,  he  was  'in  danger  of being  litigated  to
death.' A single  lawsuit  over  petroleum  cracking  patents  lasted  fifteen
years,  piling  up  court  costs  and  legal  fees  exceeding  $3  million"  (Scherer,
1970,  p.  391). Many  of  these  court  patent  cases  have  piled  up  over  the  years,
but  there  is  no global  analysis  of  how  much  they  have  reinforced  patent
protection  and  how  often  they  have  been  used  to  abuse  it.
More  generally,  given  that  the  patent  system  provides  monopoly
rights,  it  often  leads  to  restrictive  licensing.  These  restrictions  include
territorial  limitations  on  manufacture;  limitations  on licensees  export- 14  -
quantities;  limitations  on licensees  export  price; export  through  designated
agents;  tie-in  sales; grantbacks  from  licensees  and  quality  controls  on
material  inputs  and  output. Grant  back  provisions  according  to  which  a
licensee  cannot  develop  improvements  of the  technology  he is  licensing  is
another  way  by  which  the  patent  systen  can  reduce  competition  and  innovation.
It  must  be said,  that  not  all  restrictive  licensing  must  necessarily
imply  a greater  welfare  loss  than  is  implied  by  the  original  patent. In fact,
it  has  been  argued  that  many  restrictive  practices  are  used  as  a  means  to
appropriate  the  returns  of patents  while  at the  same  time  allowing  a greater
diffusion  of innovations  (Hindley,1971).  Recently  among  industrial  countries,
the  attitude  towards  restrictive  licensing  has  shifted  from  one  of
condemnation  to  neutrality  if  not  sympathy.  In  the  U.S.  for  example,  there
has  been  a proposal  (S.  438,  H.R.  557,  cited  by  Levin,  et.al.,  1987)  that
patent  license  agreements  '...  shall  not  be  deemed  illegal  per  se  under  any  of
the  antitrust  laws." A recent  OECD  report  also  holds  a similar  view. Some
quotations  from  it  are  useful. For  example,  "...The  belief  that  permitting
innovators  to  capture  the  full  returns  inherent  in  their  innovations  leads  to
a  long  term  efficient  use  of  resources,  thus  benefitting  the  consumer,  is
basic  to  the  analysis  of this  report."  Also,  "...  the  report  argues  that
long-standing  notions  if conflict  between  intellectual  property  rights  and
competition  policy  should  be  reconsidered."  (OECD,  1989,  pp.  101-102).
In  any  case,  the  logic  of  the  shift  in  attitude  by industrial
countries  is  simple  to  understand.  If  for  whatever  reasons  policymakers  favor
the  patent  system,  then  there  should  not  be too  much  concern  with  the  way  by
which  the  inventor  reaps  the  reward  from  his  patent  monopoly.  This  is  so
because  in  a  competitive  economy,  the  maximum  that  an inventor  can  gain  by
whatever  means  including  restrictive  licensing  is  given  by the  characteristics- 15  -
of the  market  and  the  importance  of the  invention.  In  contrast,  when  the  mood
used  to  be  one  of suspicion  of  the  patent  system,  policy  recommendations  in
favor  of compulsory  licensing  were  often  made  and  in  some  cases,  patents  were
even  abolished  (Machlup,  1958). In  fact,  in  many  countries  including
industrial,  compulsory  licensing  has  been  enforced  from  time  to time.
This  recent  debate  shows  that  a general  case  against  restrictive
licensing  cannot  be  made,  and  that  "...  a case  by  case  treatment  (is)  more
appropriate  ... "(OECD,  l!°9,  pp.  101-102).
Sumning  up this  section,  it  appears  that  there  are  several
characteristics  of  the  patent  system  that  results  in  social  costs  over  and
above  those  discussed  in  Section  II.  The  extent  to  which  policy  can  reduce
these  costs  is  part  of  the  ongoing  debate.
IV.  Patents  in  a Distorted  Economy
It is  at this  stage  useful  to  introduce  some  stylized  characteristics
of  developing  countries  and  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  simple  model  of
Section  II  helps  to throw  light  on patent  policies.  The  following  issues  will
be  discussed:  administrative  difficulties,  distributive  effects,  productivity
of RD trade  protection,  macroeconomic  considerations,  property  rights  in  trade
secrets,  the  sequencing  of  patent  policies,  and  patent  policies  in  presence  of
trade  retaliation.  The  analysis  in  this  section  also  provides  some  guidance
on the  timing  within  an overall  policy  reform  process  at  which  patent
protection  should  be strengthened.
1. Administrative  problems
In  principle  a patent  should  be  granted  to  a significant- 16  -
technological  advance  with  a  clear  industrial  applicability.  An important
question  in  the  administration  of the  patent  system  arises  in  connection  with
the  interpretation  of "significant  technological  advance."  This  is  not  a
trivial  matter. The  crucial  question  here  is  when  to  so  classify  an
invention.  This  takes  us Co the  stringency  of the  patent  test. In the  U.S.,
the  stringency  has  varied  over  time. For  example,  the  test  used  to be  quite
severe  in  the  free  trade,  anti-monopoly  environment  of the  1850s. In
contrast,  "...the  judicial  and  political  climate  in  the  late  1930s  became  more
hostile  to  corporate  patenting  ... "  (Griliches,  1989,  p.  8).  More  recently  in
industrial  countries,  there  has  been  a trend  in favor  of patents  and  more
generally  of  intellectual  property  rights  (see,  for  example,  OECD,  1989).
The  basic  administrative  problem  of  deciding  when  an innovation
represents  a "significant  technological  advance,"  appears  to  be  more  difficult
in  developing  than  in industrial  countries.  A serious  analysis  of inventions
often  requires  highly  qualified  people. But  can  the  public  sector  attract
such  scientists  into  its  patent  office? Given  budgetary  problems,  does it
make  sense  to  pull  scientists  into  their  public  sectors  or  are  other
expenditures  more  urgent?  Civen  the  international  role  of patents  and  the
increasing  sophistication  of investors,  can  small  developing  countries  afford
to  open  a full-services  patent  office?  In  any  case,  how  will  the  decision  on
significant  technological  advances  be taken? These  are  some  of the  questions
that  arise  when  thinking  about  the  creation  of  efficiently  managed  patent
offices  in  developing  countries.
2.  Distributive  effects  of patents
The  model  in  Section  II implicitly  assumed  that  the  benefits  of- 17  -
inventions  were  captured  by the  nationals  of the  inventing  country. This is
not  always  the  case. Long  ago  Penrose  (1951)  concluded  that  "...any  country
must  lose  if  it  grants  monopoly  privileges  in  the  domestic  market  which
neither  improve  nor  cheapen  the  goods  available,  develop  its  own  productive
capacity  nor  obtain  for  its  producers  at least  equivalent  privileges  in other
markets..."
When  the  welfare  of  nationals  are  given  greater  weight  than  that  of
foreigners,  the  optimal  patent  policy  is  modified. For  example,  in the
extreme  case  that  only  multinationals  do research  and  transfer  their  license
royalties  a&road,  the  rectangle  COENC 1 in  Figure  1  now  represents  social  costs
during  the  life  of  the  patent  and  no  benefits  accrue  to  nationals.
In the  case  where  the  profits  of innovations  are  transferred  abroad,
patents  might  still  be  justified  when  it  can  be  argued  that  innovations  made
by  multinationals  which  provide  specific  benefits  to  the  country--such  as a
new  drug  against  a local  disease--  would  otherwise  not  be  forthcoming.  In
this  case,  the  social  benefits  to the  country  at the  expiration  of  the  patents
could  be  greater  than  the  social  costs,  thus  supporting  a patent.
Table  2 shows  the  pattern  of internacional  patenting.  The  figures
show  that  as  a group,  industrial  countries  are  by far  the  most  important
innovators.  These  are  followed  by  planned  economies.  In  contrast,  between
1969  and  1979,  developing  countries  share  in  international  patenting  was  a
mere  0.4  percent.  Clearly,  developing  countries  are  net  importers  of patented
innovations.  The  extent  to  which  they  make  a  net  social  benefit  from  these
acquisitions  depends  not  only  on  the  extent  to  which  additional  benefits are
transferred  abroad,  but  also  whether  the  innovations  can  be  used  efficiently.- 18  -
3.  Productivity  of  RD
It is  likely  that  in  developing  countries  the  productivity  of RD is
lower  than  in industrial  countries.  Several  reasons  could  be listed  including
skill  deficiencies,  poor  research  equipment,  poor  quality  of inputs,  etc.
Also,  industrial  countries  having  a richer  experience  with  RD  have  accumulated
experience  which  likely  enhancen  their  productivity  of  RD.




Economies  Rapid  Slow  Developing  Planned
USA  Other Growth  Growth  Economies  Economies
Share  of inventions
1969-71  31.6  36.1  2.6  1.7  0.4  27.7
1976-79  23.3  38.5  3.3  1.0  0.4  33.6
Proportion  national
1967-71  75  33  25  17  11  76
1976-79  62  45  27  20  12  84
Ratio:  R&D/CDP
1967-71  2.7  2.0  0.8  0.4  0.6  3.1
1976-79  2.0  1.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  3.3
Source: Evenson  and  Putnam  (1987).
If the  productivity  of  RD in  developing  countries  is low,  then
increasing  patent  protection  will  not  have  a significant  impact  on
innovations,  but  will  imply  higher  prices  for  the  technology  they  acquire.
4.  Uncertainty
So far,  the  discussion  has  been  carried  out  under  the  assumption  of- 19  -
certainty.  Nevertheless,  it is reasonable  to presume  that the RD process is
surrounded  with uncertainty. This uncertainty  might refer to several
factors.  One that  has been worked  out in the literature  refers to  uncertainty
surrounding  the  extent  of cost reduction  of the innovation. In this regard,
Rafiquzzaman (1987)  has shown that  when the  extent  of cost reduction  is
uncertain  and the innovator  is risk  neutral,  the optimal  patent life is
shorter than in the perfect  certainty  case.
It might be reasonable  to presume  that  uncertainty  surrounding  the RD
is higher in  developing  countries. One reason  for this is  that the  quality of
the inputs  of the  RD process  might be more variable.  Another reason is that
go%arnment  policies  are often unstable. Thus, in order to reduce uncertainty
and increase  the productivity  of  domestic investments  in  RD, it is important
to assure that  government  policies  are supportive.
5.  The macroeconomy
Consider the situation  of an economy  characterized  by high fiscal
deficits,  growing inflation,  increasing  real interest  rates  and growing
currency  overvaluation.  In this  economy,  it is likely that investment  is
declining, the trade  surplus (if  any) is  narrowing,  protectionism  is
increasing, the residual  productivity  of the economy  is declining,  growth is
faltering  and unemployment  is increasing. Among developing  countries,  and in
particular  among the  highly indebted  ones, it is  not uncommon to find that
during the 1980s,  per capita income  and real  wages declined by 10-20%  and 50X,
respectively.  Also, the investment  and savings  ratios  of these  economies have
declined significantly;  in some  cases by as much as 50%.
There is  no empirical  basis to support  the  notion that the
productivity  problems  of these  economies  are primarily  associated  with lack of- 20 -
local innovation  in  much thie  same  way that  it  would be  erroneous to use the
Griliches  methodology  and conclude  that the decline  in total factor
productivity  of many  developing  countries  in recent  years  could be attributed
in part to  whatever patents  and innove  ions  developing  countries  have
produced.
On the other  hand, there is  evidence to suggest  that the poor
productivity  growth  of many developing  countries  is associated  with high debt-
service,  price instability,  resource  misallocation  and lack  of competitive
pressures.  For example,  in a recent  contribution  Mundlak,  et. al. (1989),
concluded that if in 1930  the Argentine  economy  would had liberalized  its
trade regime  and remained  stabilized,  sy 1984 real  GNP would had been 46%
higher than what it  actually  was, thus  implying  a faster  rate  of growth.  More
generally, the phenomenal  growth rates  of several  developing  countries is
also  illustrative  of the  effects  of competition  in spite  of weak patent
protection.
6.  Property rights  in trade secrets
Property  rights  derive from the  existence  of scarcity  of goods and
services.  The economic  justification  for  private  property  rights is that in a
competitive  economy  these rights  will allocate scarce  resources  efficiently.
In sharp contrast  to property  rights in  goods and services,
intellectual  property  rights  do not stem  from the need to allocate something
scarce.  In fact,  an idea does  not lose its  properties  with the number  of
people  acquiring it;  property  rights  granted  to ideas  create  scarcity (Usher,
1964).
The fundamental  justification  for intellectual  property  rights stems
from  the fact that in the  absence  of an appropriate  reward  system, the output- 21 -
of  new  productive  ideas  would  diminish.  11 These  rights  permit  the  inventor
to  appropriate  part  of  the  economic  return  associated  with  the  development  of
a new  idea. In  the  absence  of  intellectual  property  rights  the  return  to  new
ideas  would  diminish  and  so  would  their  output.  2/
From  a development  perspective,  some  questions  arise  including:  how
strong  is  the  institution  of  property  rights  in  developing  countries?  to  what
extent  these  countrie"'  legal  institutions--including  the  courts--are
appropriate  for  sustaining  the  patent  system?
Another  question  is  related  to  the  trade-off  between  patents  and
trade  secrets. It  has  been  observed  that  lower  patent  protection  can  imply
more  reliance  on  trade  secrets.  The  extent  to  which  substitution  between
patents  and  trade  secrets  will  affect  the  rate  of innovation  would  appear  to
depend  on the  strength  of property  rights  in  trade  secrets  and  their
enforcement.  It should  be  noted  that  very  few  countries  protect  trade
secrets,  and  the  U.S.  is  one  of these  countries  (Benko,  1988). In  general,
developing  countries  do  not  protect  property  rights  in  trade  secrets  but  some
observers  argue  that  this  should  be  a priority  area  tait  needs  closer
attention  (Prischtak,  1989). The  reason  is that  in  de  wloping  countries,
enterprises  usually  make  small  improvements  -- in general  believed  to be  non-
patentable-  to productive  process.  These  innovations  are  lost  to  competition
when  employees  move  to  competing  firms. Thus,  it is  argued,  the  protection  of
trade  secrets  would  provide  an  important  incentive  for  the  type  of  adaptative
RD  which  is  usually  performed  in  developing  ec*nomies.
l/  In  the  case  of  patents,  other  justifications  are  discussed  in  Machlup
(1958).
2/  Historically,  this  has  also  been  a point  of  debate  (Machlup,  1958).- 22  -
1.  The  sequencing  of  patent  policies
The  set  of  policies--in  this  case  patent  policies--which  are  best
suited  for  a  country,  depends  on  whether  a  country's  own  policies  are
independent  or interact  with  that  of  other  countries.  In the  case  of patents
this  distinction  appears to  be  crucial.  I  will  first  discuss  a general
suggestion  for  the  sequencing  of  patent  policies  and  then  introduce  the  case
of trade  retaliation  against  countries  with  weak  patent  protection.
Let  me assume-and  this  is  an  assumption  on  which  more  light  needs  to
be  thrown--that  in  developing  countries  patents  are  an inducement  to
innovations  in  much  the  same  way  as they  are  in industtial  countries.  The
previous  analysis  suggests  that  the  relation  between  distortions  and  the
pattern  of innovations  appears  to  be  crucial  for  assessing  the  direction  of
the  likely  welfare  effect  of patent  policies.  These  arguments  are  static.
The  risks  of  welfare  losses  get  compounded  when  patents  interact  with  product
and  factor  market  policies  in  an  unstable  and  unpredictable  way.  Take  the
situation  of tariff  protection.  An extreme  case  could  be that  depicted  in
Figure  4.  Here  PI  indicates  international  domestic  prices  and  the  doviestic
price  is  (I*t)PI  where  t  is  the  ad-valorem  tariff  rate. Initially  the
industry  produces  °Q 1 and  imports  Q,  Q2. Investment  in  RD  results  in  a new
invention  that  reduces  costs  and  shifts  the  supply  curve  to  S2 where  domestic
supply  equals  demand. Now  assume  a trade  liberalization  program  is  introduced
and  tariffs  are  dismantled.  At the  new  price  of  PI,  the  local  industry  is
unprofitable  and  only  imports  satisfy  domestic  demand. Clearly,  in those
cases  where  a local  innovation  has  no impact  on internatioral  prices,  the  RD
efforts  made  by  an internationelly  unprofitable  industry  implies  a  net  social- 23  -
loss. Again,  the  loss  does  not  stem  from  the  invention  but  from  the
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Is  this  an  extreme  case? This  is  difficult  to tell,  but  tariff  rates
in  excess  of lOOX  and  extensive  quantitative  restrictions  are  not  uncommon  in
developing  countries.  Clearly  in  these  situations,  ambitious  trade
liberalization  programs  are  likely  to  result  in some  industries  and/or  some
products,  and/or  some  lines  of  production  becoming  unprofitable.  In  recent
years  ambitious  and  fast  liberalization  policies  have  not  been  uncommon  (Laird
and  Nogu6s,  1989),  and  certainly  trade  regimes  of  many  developing  countries
remain  unstable.- 24  -
Purthermoret  the instability  of  microeconomic  policies is  compounded
by acute macroeconomic  instability. As said,  real  exchange  rate and real  wage
rate fluctuations  of 50% have not been uncommon  during the  80s.  All this
suggest  that innovations  whose benefits  remain  in Lhe country  might be good in
stable  policy environments  and will quite likely  be good in  a fully
liberalized  competitive  economy.  Thus, it  would  appear that  from a
development perspective,  a strong  patent  system  would be  appropriate  once
developing  countries  have secured  a competitive  and stable  economy;  a
position  some NICs  have achieved.  In many  other  countries,  however,  the road
to travel belore  arriving  at this stage  appears to  be long.  In this regard,
it is illustrative  to note that several  industrial  and some  newly
industrializing  countries  (NICs),  only  moved late in  their  development process
to increase  patert  protection.  When they  did so,  their economies  were
characterized  by  open markets,  competition,  an important  physical  and human
capital  beoe, and  high savings  and investment  ratios.  By that  time, they had
all the necessary  base to become  efficient innovators.
8.  Patents  and retaliation
Many developing  countries  have long  instituted  patent  regimes.  For
those  who do have one and are enforcing  it, the  previous  discussion  should be
cast in terms of changes  to the system.  Changes  ori  which the previous
analyses  throw some light include  modifications  in the  duration  of patents
expansion  in the  number of industries  falling  under the  patent system,
enhancing  the efficiency  of the patent  office,  etc.
Policy analysis  is complicated  by the fact that industrial  countries
have started to implement  retaliatory  measures  against  countries  not complying
with a minimum level  of patent  protection.  The policy  sequencing  just- 25 -
discussed  can be fundamentally  altered  in the  presence  of retaliation  or
threats  of retaliation.
For example,  one common  exclusion  from the  patent system is that of
pharmaceutical  processes  and products.  There  are 49 countries  which exclude
patents  in pharmaceutical  products  (WIPO, 1988). Pressed  by several  factors,
industrial  countries  are requesting  many  of these  countries  to include
pharmaceutical  and other products  under their  patent  laws.  For those
countries  not accepting  these  demands,  industrial  countries  have threatened
and in  some cases  effectively  retaliated  against  them.
In the presence  of retaliation,  the  main economic  consideration  is
whether the net social  benefit  of low patent  protection--assuming  there is a
social  benefit-to  pharmaceutical  products  is higher  or lower  than the scuial
-osts of retaliation. When this  cost is  higher than  the  net social benefits,
then from an economic point  of view, patents  should  be introduced.
For example, let  me assume that the  U.S. would  have implemented
retaliation  for the full value  of the loss  of US$ 84  million per year reported
by U.S. affiliates in their  301 petition  against  Argentina  for lack of patent
protection  in pharmaceutical  products  11.  Then,  on a narrowly  focused
economic  evaluation,  for  Argentina  to decide  not to introduce  patents in
pharmaceutical  products, it should  conclude  that the social  benefits  of the
status quo is  at least  equal to US$84  million  per year.
This consideration  assumes that  it does  not matter on whicih  industry
the retaliation  falls  against.  In recent  cases,  the U.S.  has retaliated  by
imposing  100Z ad-valorem  tariffs  on selected  imports  from  the infringing
1/  On Section 301 see  Crinols (1988).  While this  article  was being revised,
the Government  of Argentina  announced  that  it plans  to send to Congress  a
new patent law that  would include  pharmaceutical  products.- 26  -
country. If  the  U.S.  did  this  against  Argentina,  then  further  considerations
should  be  made. For  example,  it  could  be that  some  promising  fast  growth
export  industries  resulted  seriously  damaged  by the  retaliation  measures.
Given  the  value  of  retaliation,  this  is  noL  unlikely.  For  example,  in  1987,
Argentina's  manufactured  exports--the  type  of products  againsc  which
retaliation  would  most  likely  fall--to  the  U.S.  were  in  the  order  of  US$  600
million. Thus,  if  the  retaliatory  threats  were  to  be enforced,  it  would  mean
that  in terms  of 1987  figures,  manufactured  exports  would  decline  by  a
relatively  important  amount. This  is  a  high  enough  figure  so  as  to fear  that
the  export  prospects  of several  industries  could  be seriously  damaged  by  the
introduction  of retaliatory  measures.
It should  be said  that  because  of  their  protectionist  effect,
retaliatory  actions  will  always  hurt  the  U.S. Thus,  for  example,  the  trade
sanctions  against  Brazil  in  another  301  case  in  pharmaceutical  patents  has
hurt  not  only  Brazil  but  also  the  U.S.
So far  the  analysis  has  been  cast  in  terms  of  an  all  or nothing
situation.  Clearly,  negotiations  including  bilateral  trade  negotiations  on
patents,  are  not  always  undertaken  in  this  situation.  There  could  be  middle
of the  row  solutions  which  can  be satisfaccory  to  both  parties.  Finding  this
middle  of the  row  is  the  task  of good  negotiators.  It  is  clear  nevertheless,
that  in presence  of  policy  interactions,  the  difficulties  of searching  for
good  patent  policies  are  more  serious  than  in  the  case  where  these
interactions  are  absent.
V.  Final  Remarks
Patent  policies  seek  to  increase  the  output  of  commercially  useful
innovations  by  creating  a transitory  property  right  which  allow  the  inventor- 27 -
to  appropriate  part  of the  returns  from  his  invention.  But  in  practice,  the
issues  appear  to  be so  complex  that  after  a close  evaluation  of the  U.S.
patent  system  published  more  than  thirty  years  ago,  Machlup  recommended  that
"...  if  one  does  not  know  whether  a sysLem  as  a  whole  (in  contrast  to  certain
features  of it)  is  good  or bad,  the  satest  'policy  conclusion'  is  to  "muddle
through"--either  with  it,  if  one  has  long  lived  with  it,  or twithout  it,  if  one
has  lived  without  it. If  we  did  not  have  a patent  system,  it  would  be
irresponsible,  on the  basis  of  our  present  knowledge  of its  economic
consequences,  to  recommend  instituting  one. But  since  we have  had  a patent
system  for  a long  time,  it  would  be irresponsible,  on the  basis  of our  present
knowledge,  to recommend  abolishing  it"  (Machlup,  1958,  p.  80).
Much  empirical  research  has  been  done  since  Machlup's  conclusions
were  made  30  years  ago,  and  today  there  is  more  evidence  that  the  patent
system  has  entailed  important  benefits  to  competitive  industrial  countries.
But  it  should  be  noted  that  these  benefits  have  been  enhanced  by the  relative
stability,  openness  and  competitive  nature  of these  economies.  In  contrast,
developing  countries'  macro  and  micro  policy  instability  suggests  that  more
care  should  be  exercised.  For  example,  low  productivity  of RD  suggests  that
patent  protection  should  not  necessarily  be  as strong  as  in  high  productivity
competitive  economies.  Likewise,  even  if  the  productivity  of investments  in
RD in  similar  across  countries,  it  could  very  well  be  the  case  that  commercial
and  industrial  policy  shifts  could  force-for  example,  as  a consequence  of  an
adjustment  program--the  closing  of  some  industries.  For  those  industries,
past  investments  in  RD  will  no  longer  yield  benefits  and  might  had  provided  a
low  social  rate  of  return. This  suggests  that  patents  should  be  strengthened
once  economies  have  stabilized  and  restructured.- 28 -
In addition to these  basic resource  allocation  considerations,  it
appears that  more analysis is  needed  on the  efficiency  of management  and costs
of administering  patent  offices in  developing  countries.  Also, little is
known as to how the  courts  of these  counIries  administer  patent cases.
In light  of these  considerations,  it is  not surprising  to see that
several  industrial  economies  and some ot the  more advanced  of the NICs only
moved late in their  development  process  to strengthen  patent  protection.  When
they  did so, these economies  were characterized  by competition,  a significant
human capital stock  and high saving ratios,  i.e., they  were ready to become
efficient innovators  and exporters  of technology.- 29  -
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